Coincidence of the Shapley value and the Nucleolus in the Appointment Problem by 박나리
 
 
저 시-비 리-동 조건 경허락 2.0 한민  
는 아래  조건  르는 경 에 한하여 게 
l  저 물  복제, 포, 전송, 전시, 공연  송할 수 습니다.  
l 차적 저 물  성할 수 습니다.  
다 과 같  조건  라야 합니다: 
l 하는,  저 물  나 포  경 ,  저 물에 적  허락조건
 확하게 나타내어야 합니다.  
l 저 터  허가를  러한 조건들  적 지 않습니다.  
저 에 른  리는  내 에 하여 향  지 않습니다. 




저 시. 하는 원저 를 시하여야 합니다. 
비 리. 하는  저 물  리 적  할 수 없습니다. 
동 조건 경허락. 하가  저 물  개 , 형 또는 가공했  경
에는,  저 물과 동 한 허락조건하에서만 포할 수 습니다. 
경제학석사학위논문
Coincidence of the Shapley value 
and the Nucleolus
in the Appointment Problem
약속순서가 정해진 고정 경로를 여행하는 외판원




박   나   리
Coincidence of the Shapley value 
and the Nucleolus
in the Appointment Problem
지도교수  전   영   섭




박   나   리
박나리의 경제학석사 학위논문을 인준함.
2012년 12월
위 원 장                      
부위원장                      
위    원                      
Abstract
Coincidence of the Shapley value and the Nucleolus
in the Appointment Problem
The fixed-route traveling salesman problem with appointments, sim-
ply the appointment problem, is concerned with the following situ-
ation. A traveler makes a scheduled trip along a set of sponsors. If
a sponsor in the route cancels, the traveler returns home and moves
on to the next scheduled place from home. The cost of her trip has
to be shared by the sponsors. We are interested in finding a way of
dividing the total cost of this appointment problem among sponsors
by applying solutions developed in the cooperative game theory. On
this class of problems, we show the coincidence of three well-known
solutions of the cooperative game theory, the nucleolus, the Shapley
value, and the τ -value.
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1 Introduction
Cost allocation problems are some important issues in economics. If a group
is involved in one specific type of payment, they have to divide up the whole
cost among each person. Even if everyone struggles to lessen their burden, the
allocation should be done in a fair manner. Since all members of the group cover
the whole cost, they need to cooperate to minimize it, and no coalition should
deviate from this group and cut their cost. This is an important solution concept
in cooperative game theory: the core.
Therefore, how much they dedicated to the group and the division rule mat-
ters. Here, two well-known solutions to cooperative games with transferable
utilities(shortly, TU games), the Shapley value(Shapley 1953) and the Nucleo-
lus(Schmeidler 1969), can be introduced. The Shapley value assigns to each
player a payoff equal to a weighted average of her marginal contributions to
all possible coalitions, with weights being determined by the sizes of coalitions.
The nucleolus chooses an allocation which minimizes the difference between the
worth of a coalition and its payoff in the lexicographic way.
Generally, we know that it is possible that the core is empty in TU games.
Although the Shapley value can be calculated in TU games, the solution is not
always in the core. However, if the core is non-empty, the nucleolus exists in
the core. Then, what if the Shapley value is in the core and we can obtain the
nucleolus? What difference exists between the Shapley value and the nucleolus?
In this article, the fixed-route traveling salesman game with appointment (simply,
the appointment game), which is introduced in Yengin(2011), is the main problem
of cost allocation. The cases in the real world are introduced as follows:
We assume that each customer is to be visited exactly once but her home can
be visited more than once if it is necessary, for example, when the service provider
needs to replenish her supplies, or perform maintenance for the machinery/tools,
after visiting a group of customers and before visiting the rest. There may also
be customers who come to the main office for the service. Another reason may
be that the traveler has appointments to meet with the customers and there is con-
siderable waiting time between two consecutive appointments. Then, in between
those appointments, she would go home (or to her office) and wait there.
In this appointment game, the Shapley value is calculated in simple and fasci-
nating form[proposition 1(Yengin(2011))]. Also he gives the fact that the appoint-
ment game has a non-empty core in a given economy. Furthermore the Shapley
value is in the core in this game[proposition 2(Yengin(2011)), Shapley(1971)].
Therefore, we can find the relationship between the Shapley value and the nucle-
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olus.
The original "traveling salesman problem (TSP)" is a well-known combinato-
rial optimization problem in operations research. The service provider (salesman,
repairman, parcel delivery guy, private tutor etc.) finds a route and decides the
order of visitation simultaneously in order to travel with minimum costs. Math-
ematically, let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} denote the places to visit and the Hamiltonian
cycle z be the complete graph with vertex set N . Then, the TSP solves the cost
allocation problem in a minimum weight Hamiltonian cycle z with a condition
that the vertex should be visited at least once. Note that there is no home and
fixed start point (vertex) in this original TSP.
Let 0 denote home with agent set N = {1, 2, · · · , n} and let g be a directed
graph with node set N ∪ {0}, such that for each ordered pair i, j ∈ N ∪ {0} there
is a directed path from i to j. Furthermore, a non-negative weight is assigned to
each arc in the graph. A tour for coalition S is a round trip along the arcs in the
graph of the repairman, who starts in 0, visits each customer in S at least once,
and returns home. Dror(1990) shows that the core of a TSG without a home city
is empty.
Potters et al.(1992) introduce the fixed route TSG which has a home. In this
TSG, the order in which the players are served remains the same for all coalitions.
They show that if the cost matrix satisfies the triangle inequality, and the fixed
route is a minimal cost TSP route for the grand coalition, then the core is non-
empty for the fixed route TSG.
Now, the fixed-route TSG with appointment has two additional representative
conditions. First, if some appointments are canceled, the traveler still has to follow
the initial appointment schedule due to the costs of rescheduling, inflexibility of
the available or suitable times of other customers, etc. Second, if an appointment
is canceled, then the traveler has to wait a lengthy period of time until the next
appointment. Then, the service provider has two options: either she can wait at
(or close by) the previous or next appointee’s location until the next appointment
starts, or she can go home (main office) and wait there. These seem like quite
strong conditions, but the characteristic function is mathematically interesting. We
can check the 2-person additivity which is introduced in Chun and Hokari(2007),
after some adjustments to the characteristic function.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the general economy of a fixed
route TSG is introduced and the appointment game is defined in the economy. In
section 3, the main result of this article, coincidence of the Shapley value and the
nucleolus in the appointment game, will be discussed. Before the main proof, the
cost-saving game is introduced to deal with the benefits of agents instead of their
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costs. By virtue of the cost saving game, we can find the relationship between
the Shapley value and the nucleolus so that setting the cost saving function is
very important. Also, we get a result in which the τ − value coincides with
previous solutions. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of our findings and
future research directions.
2 The model
The appointment game is introduced in Yengin(2012), formally as the fixed-route
traveling salesman game with appointments. We adopt the model and find the
coincidence of the Shapley value and the nucleolus in this appointment game.
2.1 The economy
Let N ≡ {1, 2, · · · } be infinitely many "potential" sponsors. Let N ⊂ N with
|N | ≥ 2 be a finite and ordered list of sponsors and the class of all such N is N .
Let 0 denote home and for each N ∈ N , N0 ≡ N ∪ {0}.
The sponsors in N are listed in increasing order and the sponsors are visited
in the same order as they appear in N if i = 7, j = 9, and k = 3, then N =
{k, i, j} = {3, 7, 9}, and in an economy with sponsor set N , the first sponsor
visited by the traveler is k and the last one is j.
For a given N ∈ N and M ∈ N, a route r = (i1, i2, · · · , iM) over N is an
ordered list of the agents (sponsors and home) to be visited by a "traveler" such
that
(i) the route starts from home and ends at home (i.e., i1 = iM = 0),
(ii) each sponsor is visited exactly once,
(iii) home can be visited more than once,
(iv) after sponsor i ∈ N is visited, either home or the next highest numbered
sponsor in N is visited (i.e., the relative order of the sponsors in r respect
their order in N ).
For each N ∈ N and each pair {i, j} ⊆ N0, i is connected to j on a route r
(denoted as i r j), if after i, the next agent visited is j : r = (0, · · · , i, j, · · · , 0).
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Let ci,j ≥ 0 be the cost of traveling between agents i and j. For each i ∈ N , let
ci ≡ c0,i ≡ ci,0 be the cost of traveling between home and sponsor i.
For each N ∈ N , the cost of a route r over N is c(r) =
∑
{i,j}⊆N0:irj ci,j .
Given N ∈ N , let c = {ci,j :⊆ N0}. For each N , an economy for N is
e = 〈N, c, r〉 ∈ EN where E = ∪N∈NEN is the domain of all economies. For
each route r over N , a sponsor set S = {j, k, l, · · · ,m} ⊆ N is a connected set
on r if and only if 0 r j r k r l r · · · r m r 0. For each e ∈ EN ,
let Se be the set of all connected sets in economy e. For a given N ∈ N , we
can associate a graph with each e = 〈N, c, r〉. The elements of N0 are called
nodes, 0 being the source. A link between nodes i and j (denoted as lij ) is a
direct path between them. Let li ≡ l0i be the link between home and i. Let
L = {lij : i, j ⊆ N0} be the set of all links between all agents in the problem. A
graph g over N0 is a subset of L. The graph associated with e = 〈N, c, r〉 ∈ EN
is g(e) = {lij : {i, j} ⊆ N0 and i r j} where each link lij in g(e) is associated
with weight ci,j .
2.2 The appointment game
Now, the fixed-route traveling salesman game with appointments(in short, the ap-
pointment game) is formally introduced as follow.
Let N ∈ N , e = 〈N, c, r〉 ∈ EN , and S ⊆ N . Let the permissible route over
S (denoted as rS) be as follows:
For some T ≥ |S|, let rS = (0, j1, j2, · · · , jT , 0) be such that:
(i) for each t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, jt ∈ S0, and for each i ∈ S, there is a unique
t ∈ {1, · · · , T} such that i ≡ jt on rS ,
(ii) j1 = mini∈S i and jT = maxi∈S i,
(iii) for each jt ∈ S with t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T} and each i ∈ N such that jt r i, if
i ∈ S0, then jt rS jt+1 ≡ i,
otherwise jt rS jt+1 ≡ 0, and
(iv) for each jt ≡ 0 with t ∈ {2, · · · , T − 1}, we have jt rS min{k : k ∈
S and k > jt−1}.
Each e = 〈N, c, r〉 ∈ EN , the fixed-route traveling salesman game with ap-
pointments (in short, appointment game) associated with e is
(N, ce) where ce : 2N → R+
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is such that for each S ⊆ N , ce(S) = c(rS). Let VE = {(N, ce) : N ∈ N , e =
〈N, c, r〉 ∈ EN} be the class of appointment games. Note that for each N ∈ N
and each e = 〈N, c, r〉 ∈ EN , ce(N) = c(r) and for each S ∈ Se, ce(S) = c(rS).
Since c(r) =
∑
S∈Se c(rS), ce(N) =
∑
S∈Se ce(S). For each S ⊆ N , let cS =
{ci,j ≥ 0 : {i, j} ⊆ S0}. The economy restricted to S with respect to rS is
eS = 〈S, cS, rS〉 ∈ ES . Here, we denote ce({i}) ≡ c(i) = 2ci without ambiguity.
In appointment games, a weaker condition is sufficient for the core to be non-
empty. First of all, we do not need that r be a least costly tour for N . Second, we
only need that given a route, for each pair of connected sponsors, the sum of their
costs of connecting to home is greater than the cost of connecting to each other.
Formally, for each N ∈ N , each r over N , and each pair {i, j} ⊆ N such that
i r j, ci + cj ≥ ci,j . For each N ∈ N , let ENT be the set of all economies with
sponsor set N where this condition holds and ET =
⋃
N∈N ENT . Let VET be the
class of appointment games associated with economies in ET .
On the domain VET , appointment games are convex and the Shapley value
is in the core[Proposition 2(Yengin(2012)) by Shapley(1971)]. This shows that
working on the domain VET is a sufficient condition for the core to be non-empty.
Thus, we know that there exists a nucleolus in the game. Note that the characteris-
tic function of the appointment game is a cost function so that the game is actually
concave.
Next, given an appointment with sponsors in S ∈ N and the permissible route
over S(rS), we will prove the coincidence of the Shapley value and the nucleolus
in this appointment game.
3 Main characterization
To prove the coincidence of the Shapley value and the nucleolus in appointment
games, we introduce the coincidence property proposed by Chun and Hokari(2007).
They showed that if the class of games satisfying two conditions[Lemma 1(Chun
and Hokari(2007))], that is, every one-person-coalition’s payoff is zero and the
cost of a coalition with more than two people can be expressed as a sum of costs
of two-person coalitions, the coincidence holds. Thus we can prove the main
result after an adjustment of the appointment game’s characteristic function.
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3.1 The cost saving function
Let N ∈ N , e = 〈N, c, r〉 ∈ EN , and S ⊆ N . Since the characteristic function
ce(S) = c(rS), simply c(S), of appointment game is concave, we will transform














{ci + ci+1 − ci,i+1}.
A game is convex if for each S, T ∈ N , v(S)+v(T ) ≤ v(S∪T )+v(S∩T ). The
cost saving game (N, v) is convex. Here, iSk is the last sponsor in the connected
set Sk ⊆ S. From the definition, we get v({i}) =
∑
i∈{i} c(i)− c({i}) = 0.
From now, we will work on the domain VET so that v(S) means ve(S).
Proposition 1. On the domain VET , the Shapley value and the Nucleolus coincide
in the appointment game (N, c) if the Shapley value and the Nucleolus coincide
in the cost saving game (N, v).
Proof. It suffices to show that if the Nucleolus and the Shapley value correspond-
ing to the cost saving function v are the same, the Nucleolus and the Shapley value
corresponding to the cost function c in the appointment game will also be equal.





(1) Given value function v of the cost saving game, with an allocation x ∈ RN ,
the excess for a coalition S is eS(v, x) ≡
∑
i∈S xi − v(S). Let the excess vector
of v be θ(v, x) = (eS1(v, x), eS2(v, x), · · · , eSk(v, x)) where k = 2n − 2. The
imputation set of v is X(v) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i xi = v(N) and xi ≥ v(i) for all i}.
Given x, y ∈ RN , x ≤(lex) y means that x is lexicographically less than or equal
to y. Then the nucleolus of (N, v) is defined to be
Nuc(N, v) = {y|θ(v, y) ≤(lex) θ(v, x), for all x ∈ X(v)}.
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(2) Given cost function c of the appointment game, with an allocation x ∈ RN ,
the excess for a coalition S is eS(c, x) ≡ c(S)−
∑
i∈S xi. The excess vector of c be
θ(c, x) = (eS1(c, x), eS2(c, x), · · · , eSk(c, x)) where k = 2n − 2. The imputation
set of c is X(c) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i xi = c(N) and xi ≤ c(i) for all i}. Then the
nucleolus of (N, c) is defined to be
Nuc(N, c) = {y|θ(c, y) ≤(lex) θ(c, x), for all x ∈ X(c)}.
From the definition of v(S), we can find the relation between the excess of the
cost saving game eS(v, x) and the excess of the cost function of the appointment
game eS(c, x). For each i ∈ S ⊆ N with the allocation x ∈ X(v), define the cost














{c(i)− xi} = c(S)−
∑
i∈S
zi = eS(c, z).
An allocation rule is efficient if for an allocation x ∈ X(v), v(N) =
∑
i∈N xi











c(i)− v(N) = c(N).
Also, if an allocation x is in the imputation set X(v), then cost z belongs to
X(c). By definition of the cost saving game v, we know that v({i}) = 0 so that
for x ∈ X(v), each xi ≥ v(i), that is, xi ≥ 0. This implies that inequality
zi = c(i)−xi ≤ c(i) always holds. Therefore, if an allocation x belongs to X(v),
then the allocation z belongs to X(c).
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Now, we can say that if an allocation x is the Nucleolus of (N, v), then the
cost allocation z ≡ {zi = c(i)− xi for all i ∈ N} is the Nucleolus of (N, c).




|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)].




|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
[c(S ∪ {i})− c(S)].
By definition of v(S) =
∑
i∈S c(i)− c(S),
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = (
∑
j∈S∪{i}




= c(i)− c(S ∪ {i}) + c(S) = c(i)− {c(S ∪ {i})− c(S)}.
Therefore, we get φi(v) = c(i)− φi(c) and φi(c) = c(i)− φi(v).
From the results of Step 1 and Step 2, we get following conclusion. In the ap-
pointment game, if we prove thatNuc(N, v) = φ(N, v), we also getNuc(N, c) =
φ(N, c). Note that the allocation x of the appointment game on the domain VET
belongs to the imputation set X(c).
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and an appointment route be given by r =
{0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 4, 5, 0}, and the appointment with sponsor 5 be canceled and the
coalition is S = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then the route for S is rS = {0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 4, 0},
8
Figure 1: Example 1












ci + (c1,2 − c1 − c2) + (c2,3 − c2 − c3)




{ci + ci+1 − ci,i+1}
= (c1 + c2 − c1,2) + (c2 + c3 − c2,3)
Next, with Proposition 1, we will prove the coincidence of the Shapley value
and the Nucleolus in the Appointment Game by using the cost saving function v.
3.2 Coincidence of the Shapley value and the Nucleolus in the
Appointment Game
The coincidence of the Shapley value and the Nucleolus in the cost saving game
can be easily proved by the method by (Chun, Hokari(2007)).
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First, the basic setting of the queueing game and the two-person additive game
will be introduced.
Let N ≡ {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of agents. Each agent i ∈ N costs his unit
waiting cost, θi ≥ 0, and is assigned a position σi ∈ N in a queue and a positive
or negative transfer ti ∈ R. Each agent in σthi position has own waiting cost of
(σi − 1)θi. A queueing problem is defined as a list q = (N, θ) where N is the set
of agents and θ ∈ RN+ is the vector of unit waiting costs. Let QN be the class of
all problems for N . An allocation for q ∈ Q is a pair x = (σ, t) where for each
i ∈ N .
A set S ⊆ N is a coalition. A game is a real-valued function v defined on all
coalitions S ⊆ N satisfying v(∅) = 0. The number v(S) is the worth of S. Let
ΓN be the class of games with players set N . For each S ⊆ N , its worth vq(S) is
defined by setting: vq(S) = −
∑
t∈S(σi − 1)θi, where σ∗ ∈ Eff(S, θS), which
minimize the total waiting cost, and θS = (θi)i∈S . Since the game vq is concave,
for each S ⊆ N , the queueing cost game, vc(S) ≡ −vq(S) is defined. Obviously
vc is a game in ΓN . Moreover, vc is convex and its nucleolus is well-defined.
Lemma 1. (Chun, Hokari(2007))
For each q ∈ QN , its queueing cost game vc satisfies
(i) for each i ∈ N , vc(i) = 0;




vc(T ) and vc(S) ≥ 0.
Chun and Hokari(2007) generalized that the Shapley value and the Nucleolus
coincide in the particular games that satisfy the two conditions, with the following
three lemmas.
Let Γ̃N be the class of games satisfying the two conditions of Lemma 1(Chun,
Hokari(2007)).
Lemma 2. (Chun, Hokari(2007))






Lemma 3. (Chun, Hokari(2007))




v(S), then for each S ⊆ N ,
v(S)−
∑
i∈S xi = v(N\S)−
∑
i∈N\S xi.
For each v : 2N → RN with
∑
i∈N xi = v(N), and each α ∈ R, let Sα(v, x) ≡
{S ∈ 2N |S 6= ∅ and v(S)−
∑
i∈S xi ≥ α}
A collection B ⊆ 2N of coalitions is strictly balanced on N if there exists a list





For each v ∈ ΓN and each x ∈ I(v), x = Nuc(v) if and only if
for each α ∈ R with Sα(v, x) 6= ∅, there exists S ⊆ {{i}|i ∈ N} and v({i}) −
xi = 0 such that Sα(v, x) ∪ S is strictly balanced on N .
These lemmas give the following theorem.
Theorem. (Chun, Hokari(2007)) For each v ∈ Γ̃N , φ(v) = Nuc(v).
Now, we are ready to prove the most important result in this paper.
Theorem 2. Given economy e = 〈N, c, r〉 ∈ EN , the Nucleolus and the Shapley
value of appointment game (N, ce) coincide.
Proof. The proof starts by implying the condition of (Chun, Hokari(2007)) to the
cost saving game v(S). Given an economy e = 〈N, c, r〉 ∈ EN , we will show that
the cost saving game v(S) is in the class of Γ̃N .
For each route of appointment rs, its cost saving game v(S) satisfies
(i) for each i ∈ N , v(i) = 0;




v(T ) and v(S) ≥ 0.
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The condition (i) is easily checked by the definition of v(S), that is, v({i}) =∑
i∈{i} c(i)− c({i}) = 0.
Condition (ii) holds, since the value of v(T ) for each pair {i, j} ∈ N is defined
as,
v({i, j}) =
ci + cj − ci,j , if i rS j,0 , otherwise.
Precisely, we can derive the given equation in (ii) from the original definition





























{ci + cj − ci,j}.
Now we know that the cost saving function v(S) satisfies two conditions in
Lemma 1. We already showed that v(S) is convex(in Proposition 1). Thus the
game (N, v) is in the class of game Γ̃N . According to Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and
Lemma 4, we accomplish the final result in the cost saving game. For each cost
saving function v ≡ ve ∈ VET , φ(v) = Nuc(v). Eventually, by Proposition 1, the
coincidence of the Shapley value and the Nucleolus coincide in the appointment
game.
Here, we have some examples showing Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 for an ap-
pointment game.
Example 2. Let S = {1, 2, 3, 4}. For all T ⊆ S, |T | = 2, the cost saving function
v(T ) is determined as v({1, 2}) = {c1 + c2 − c1,2}, v({2, 3}) = {c2 + c3 − c2,3},
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v({3, 4}) = {c3 + c4 − c3,4} and v({1, 3}) = v({1, 4}) = v({2, 4}) = 0 since
1 rS 3, 1 rS 4, 2 rS 4 .
v(S) = v({1, 2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({1, 4}) + v({2, 3}) + v({2, 4}) + v({3, 4})
= v({1, 2}) + v({2, 3}) + v({3, 4})
= {c1 + c2 − c1,2}+ {c2 + c3 − c2,3}+ {c3 + c4 − c3,4}
The next example shows that the Shapley value of the appointment game is
derived from the cost saving function and Lemma 2.
Example 3. Let S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and the appointment route be given by rS =
(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 0, 5, 0). Now we can indirectly get the Shapley value of the appoint-
ment game applying the cost saving function to Lemma 2.
i) Sh1(v) = 12(c1 − c1,2 + c2), so that












iii) Sh3(v) = 12(c2 − c2,3 + 2c3 − c3,4 + c4), so that




iv) Sh4(v) = 12(c3 − c3,4 + c4), so that




v) Sh5(v) = 0, so that Sh5(c) = 2c5.
In fact, the same result of the Shapley value can be obtained in Proposition
1(Yengin(2012)). For each N ∈ N , each e = 〈N, c, r〉 ∈ EN , and each i ∈ N ,
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• if 0 r i r 0,then
SVi(ve) = 2ci.
• if there is j ∈ N\{i} such that either 0 r i r j or j r i r 0, then
SVi(ve) =
3ci + ci,j − cj
2
.




(2ci + ch,i + ci,k − ch − ck).
Remark. Given cost saving game (N, v), the Nucleolus and the Shapley value also
coincide with the τ -value(Chun, Hokari(2007)).
For each v ∈ ΓN and each i ∈ N , let Mi(v) ≡ v(N) − v(N\{i}) and
mi(v) ≡ v({i}). Then, the τ -value(Tijs 1987) selects the maximal feasible al-
location on the line connecting M(v) ≡ (Mi(v))i∈N and m(v) ≡ (mi(v))i∈N .
τ -value, τ : For each convex game v,
τ(v) ≡ λM(v) + (1− λ)m(v),
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is chosen so as to satisfy∑
j∈N
[λ(v(N)− v(N\{j})) + (1− λ)v({j})] = v(N).
For a cost saving game v, m(v) = 0. Also, for each j ∈ N , v(N) −
v(N\{j}) =
∑
j∈S,|S|=2 v(S) and that λ =
1
2
. Therefore, the τ -value coincides
with the Shapley value, and also the nucleolus in the cost saving games.
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Also, the appointment game satisfies this coincidence with the τ -value. Since,
the appointment game is concave, let τ(c) be
τ(c) ≡ −λM(c)− (1− λ)m(c),
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is chosen so as to satisfy∑
j∈N
[−λ(c(N)− c(N\{j}))− (1− λ)c({j})] = −c(N).
For an appointment game c, and for each j ∈ N ,∑
j∈N













Therefore, λ = 1
2
holds. From the definition of v(S) =
∑
i∈S c(i)− c(S), we can
derive τj(c) = −12(c(N) − c(N\{j}) + c(j)) =
1
2
(v(N) − v(N\{j})) = τj(v).
That is, the τ -value in the cost saving game and the appointment game coincide.
This gives us an expanded result that the Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the
τ -value coincide in the appointment game.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that the Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the τ -value
coincide in the fixed-route traveling game. The game has a good condition, that it
has a non-empty core. Also, the Shapley value can be easily represented and the
nucleolus is easily obtained. It can also be handled as a 2-person additive game.
However, the condition that the traveler goes back to her home or waits until the
next appointment starts when an appointment is canceled seems to be restrictive
in TSG. Therefore, more generalized model settings are required.
15
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약속순서가 정해진 고정 경로를 여행하는 외판원문제(Fixed-route
traveling salesman problem with appointments), 약칭(略稱)하여 약속 문
제(Appointment problems)에서는 다음과 같은 상황을 상정한다. 여행자는
자신의 집에서 출발하여 다시 집으로 돌아오는데, 주어진 스폰서 집합 내
에서 일정이 짜인 여행을 한다. 만약 약속된 경로 상의 한 스폰서가 약속
을 취소하면, 여행자는 자신의 집으로 돌아온 후에 집에서부터 다음 약속
장소로 이동한다. 여행자의 여행비용은 방문을 받은 스폰서들이 부담하게
된다. 이 때, 협조게임이론에서 개발된 분배규칙을 적용하여 스폰서들에게
약속문제의 총비용을 배분하는 방식에 대해 논의한다. 이 논문에서는 위와
같은 클래스의 문제에 대해 협조게임이론에서 잘 알려진 배분규칙인 섀플
리 밸류(Shapley value), 중핵(Nucleolus), 타우-밸류(τ-value)가 일치함을
보인다.
주요어 : 고정 경로 외판원문제, 약속 문제, 일치, 섀플리 밸류, 중핵,
타우-밸류.
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